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ABSTRACT

Efforts of educational interest groups to defeat merit pay for Pennsylvania teachers during 1983-1986 are explored in this case study. Political systems theory and allocative theory provide the conceptual framework. Deutsch's (1973) outline of variables that affect the course of conflict was used to organize indepth personal interviews and a content analysis. Reasons for teacher opposition and administrator support, the most frequently used influencing mechanisms, sources of influence, legislative access points, and norms of the educational policy-making process are discussed. Analysis of the pitfalls of an educational issue with high political and professional interest reminds the uninitiated who pursue legislative change of the realities of the political process. Appendices include Keefe and Ogul's (1969) lobbying techniques, the interview guide, and an outline of Deutsch's variables. (46 references) (LMI)

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THE EFFORTS OF EDUCATIONAL INTEREST GROUPS TO DEFEAT MERIT PAY FOR TEACHERS IN PENNSYLVANIA: 1983-1986

By

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For the

Eastern Educational Research Association's Annual Conference

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THE STUDY

Introduction

In the early twentieth century, a group of university presidents, school superintendents, and lay allies banded together in an effort to eradicate what was viewed as political corruption from the schools. These "progressives," as they were later named, emerged to divorce the educational system from politicians who "regarded the schools as a useful support for the spoils system and awarded jobs and contracts as political favors" (Wirt & Kirst, 1972, pp. 5-6). A myth was thus created that education was an "apolitical" entity. Due to the advantages to schoolmen of operating with immunity from outside interference, the myth was perpetuated until recent decades. Although for the most part this myth no longer exists, a consequence of this separation has been a lack of scrutiny by political science researchers. Until the sixties, "education, especially at the state level, has not been thought of as an area for study in terms of politics, the process from which policies emerge" (Milstein & Jennings, 1973, p. 7).

Today educators are beginning to realize that understanding the educational policy-making process and taking an active role in it are critical to "bringing political resources to bear on the needs of education" (Milstein & Jennings, 1973, p. v). They have discovered that if they do not "play such a dynamic role . . . that others will play it for them with less than optimal results for education"

(Milstein & Jennings, 1973, p. v). Due to a variety of political, social, and economic variables, the role of the state in educational governance has increased. Not surprisingly, the focus of activity of educational interest groups has increased as well. Thus, through the acceptance of the necessity of involvement and consequent political participation, the study of educational interest group activity becomes significant (Kirst & Somers, 1981, p. 235).

Concurrently, the nation's educational system was involved in a reform movement initiated by the 1983 Committee on Excellence in Education publication entitled A Nation At Risk. Resultant educational reform efforts at the state level cover an extensive range of policy options. Among state initiatives for educational reform, the most popular issue in the public's eyes has been compensation plans for teachers (Hansen, 1984). Although a push for excellence motivated debate of compensation plans, an impending teacher shortage added impetus to study of the issue (Rosenholtz & Smylie, 1984). The need to attract and retain teachers in addition to the desire to promote excellence intensified discussion of this educational policy reform option.

Much controversy has developed in the educational arena regarding teacher compensation plans. Because of the impact of what might constitute a structural change in the payment plan of teachers, educational interest groups have taken an active role in attempting to influence state policy decision-making regarding the issue. For example, active lobbying efforts have taken place in Pennsylvania to affect the outcome of teacher compensation plans. The direction of

the State towards merit pay is an illustration of a point of contention in this debate.

As political scientists began to study education as a political process, specific issues were brought into focus to depict the means used by educational interest groups to influence decision-making (Mitchel, 1981). Due to the emergence of controversy, the merit pay issue afforded an opportunity to study a segment of the political process in action, namely, the efforts of educational interest groups to affect educational policy-making in Pennsylvania.

Statement of the Problem

In a publication entitled Turning the Tide: An Agenda for Excellence in Pennsylvania Public Schools (1983), Pennsylvania's response to A Nation At Risk, Republican Governor Richard Thornburgh introduced a measure that would have provided $10 million a year for Excellence in Teaching Awards of $2,000 each to the top 5% of each school district's outstanding teachers. Regarding locus of control, the request provided financial resources to districts for the development of their own criteria for the incentive payment.

The proposal for the awards, however, never passed. Upon discovery of the proposal, lobbying efforts against the bill arose almost immediately. Educational interest groups organized to oppose the proposal. Their political efforts resulted in the defeat of this incentive plan for teachers thus far.

Educators and the public in general typically remained unaware of the policy struggles regarding the merit pay educational issue. A void in knowledge thus exists in light of this current educational

policy and gives rise to the question of what efforts were made by the educational interest groups to defeat merit pay in Pennsylvania. In order to examine the opposition to the merit pay proposal, the following central question was formulated: What efforts were made by educational interest groups to defeat merit pay for teachers in Pennsylvania: 1983-1986?

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

Demographics and trends in the teaching profession reveal a decline in both the number of students who are preparing to teach and the number who will remain in teaching. If unchecked, these forces will undoubtedly have repercussions on the teaching profession and on the quality of education as well (Watts, 1986). For these reasons, educational policy-makers are giving serious consideration to a structural change in the payment plans of teachers and to teacher incentive itself.

Merit Pay As An Educational Policy Reform Measure

The opening words in the report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983), a committee formulated by Terrel H. Bell to examine the state of the art of education, read, "Our nation is at risk" (p. 5).

Although first introduced to American public education in 1910 (ERIC Clearinghouse, 1981), the current emphasis on merit pay as an educational policy reform measure was begun by President Ronald Reagan in a commencement address at Seton Hall University in New Jersey on

May 21, 1983. His contention was that, by providing financial incentives for outstanding teachers, the quality of education would improve (Lytle, 1983). His purpose in debating the issue stems from the logic of using money to reward and encourage better teaching, thereby producing educational quality (ERIC, 1981). The basis of this thinking is that teachers choose the easy route of mediocrity as opposed to the more demanding of excellence because a teacher, through what is described as lock step salary scales, is paid the same regardless of the quality of his/her instruction (Casey, 1979). The more effort put forth by the teacher, the more minimal the returns; that is, lock step salary scales "implicitly reward mediocrity" (Eric, 1981, p. 2). In this respect, merit pay is viewed as a structural change in the traditional educational policy of paying teachers.

A second reason for scrutinizing merit pay as a policy measure is to attract more academically able students and, at the very least, more students in general, to the teaching profession. Lytle (1983) stated that starting salaries for teachers are less than other professions which require similar educational credentials. Miller and Say (1982) asserted that the incentive of higher pay in business and industry continues to lure talented individuals away from education. In a work entitled "The Strategic Design of Reward Systems," Lawler (1982) suggested that the type of person attracted to an organization is influenced by the kind and level of rewards an organization offers. He further added that better performers need to be more highly rewarded than mediocre or poor performers.

In addition to attracting capable educators, a purpose of con-

sidering merit pay as an educational policy measure is to retain the present number of excellent teachers (de Felix, 1981). Many teachers today regret choosing teaching as an occupation. Recent surveys reveal that, compared with their counterparts twenty years ago, fewer academically superior education majors still anticipate being teachers by age 30. One basic belief is that any occupation in which "merit is totally divorced from rewards will fail to retain . . . creative, dedicated individuals" (Schrag, 1983, p. 28). English (1984) explained this position by asserting that the only existing reward for teachers is advancement into administration. This flat hierarchy allows no differentiation of jobs for which to work. The absence of some organizational arrangement of steps thus impedes "the development of full professionalism" (p. 76) and stifles talented individuals. In order to receive monetary reward for effort to realize one's potential, quality teachers are forced to look elsewhere. Merit pay is thus viewed as a policy measure to retain more and better teachers in the schools.

To summarize, the most critical problems now facing educational policy-makers are: (a) the lack of high ability and high performance teachers, and (b) the inability of the field to attract and retain teachers. The question facing policy-makers is whether merit pay is indeed a viable solution to these critical concerns.

In a study of state policy options regarding performance based pay for teachers, Astuto and Clark (1985) reported that "96 percent of local education agencies are not using pay for performance systems and [that] more L.E.A.'s that have tried merit pay systems have dropped

them than retained them" (p. 2). In a survey by the Educational Research Service in years 1979 and 1983 of reasons why districts had eliminated their merit pay plans, district administrators stated the following problems: (a) unsatisfactory evaluation procedures (the key problem): Districts noted that plans failed due to a lack of impartiality, reliability, or validity; (b) administrative problems: Change in district leadership, time needed for evaluation and record keeping, and failure to meet program goals were listed; (c) staff dissention: The problems created were lowered teacher morale, opposition by teacher unions, jealousy among teachers, and charges of favoritism by evaluators; (d) financial problems: Reasons included lack of funds to support the merit system, insufficient funds to make a meaningful distinction between merit and non-merit increments, and the unanticipated level of the cost of the plan to the local taxpayer (Astuto & Clark, 1985). Lipsky and Bacharach (1983) cited similar critical problem areas as evaluators, measurement tools, performance criteria, the use of money as a motivator, staff morale, and costly implementation.

In addition to the foregoing review of the literature, a question which faces policy-makers is whether merit pay does, in fact, motivate better performance and promote quality.

Vroom's expectancy theory posits that individuals are more likely to strive for higher performance if they can expect a valued reward as their payoff. People behave in a manner which leads to valued rewards (Perry & Pearce, 1983). Lawler (1980) supported the notion that pay can be used as a motivator. He posits that pay is important to most

people but cautions that, to succeed, it must be tied directly to specific performance in a visible, credible, and objective way.

Some researchers, however, have challenged the idea that money motivates teachers. Lortie (1975) stated that teachers are primarily motivated by intrinsic satisfactions or rewards, i.e., feelings of effectiveness and competence inherent in the work, as opposed to extrinsic satisfactions, i.e., external to the job - including pay. Sergiovanni (1967) reached the same conclusion and indicated that money may induce dissatisfaction as well. To explain, Deci's reciprocal-influence theory asserts that intrinsic motivation decreases when it becomes dependent on external motivation, such as merit pay, because the "locus of causality shifts from within the person to the external reward" (cited in Miskel, 1982, p. 69). In effect, extrinsic rewards can actually reduce the intrinsic motivation of teachers resulting in a counterproductive process. When offered as information and not as an attempt to control behavior, positive feedback only was identified as an extrinsic reward which compliments intrinsic reward, thereby, increasing motivation (ERIC, 1981).

Herzberg (1959) identified two sets of factors which motivate and maintain high quality performance and which account for job satisfaction (motivation) and job dissatisfaction (hygiene). His motivation-hygiene theory lists job satisfiers as those related to work content including achievement, recognition for such achievement, intrinsic interest in the work, growth, and advancement. Factors indicated as job dissatisfiers are extrinsic to work content including matters of company policy, administration, supervision, interpersonal

relationships, working conditions, salary status, and security. Herzberg found money a hygiene factor or dissatisfier, not a motivator. According to Herzberg's theory, dissatisfaction may occur if hygiene factors are not erased. However, high or sustained motivation does not automatically result when dissatisfiers are eliminated. For example, if a teacher is concerned about working conditions or pay (hygiene), that person's efforts to achieve rewards (motivators) are depleted. Following this premise, attention to meeting motivational needs should follow attention to hygiene needs (Frase, Hetzel, & Grant, 1982). Lipsky and Bacharach (1983) concurred that money is important to teachers for reasons unrelated to motivation for more effective performance.

Included in the study on human motivation is the tenet that "positive self-esteem is an important motivating factor" (ERIC, 1981, p. 4). Meyer (1975) stated that "persons with high self-esteem will consistently and significantly outperform persons with low self-esteem" (p. 45). He suggested that the overall affect on an organization of pay increases based on motivation is probably more negative than positive as the self-esteem of the portion of employees not receiving merit pay decreases as a result. Lamar Alexander (1985), Governor of the state of Tennessee, applied the foregoing research in the following statement:

> Higher pay, better working conditions, and satisfaction -important as they are - by themselves won't attract and keep the best men and women in public school classrooms over the next several years. If we really want to keep and attract superior teachers, we had better think of some new and better ways to honor, respect, and award prestige to teachers. (p. 33)

In terms of bringing research into practice, merit pay can thus cause theoretical concerns to policy-makers in addition to the financial, administrative, and evaluation problems mentioned above.

Finally, merit pay plans have been tried before but with little success (Brandt & Dronka, 1985; Johnson, 1983). Educators are aware of the many problems inherent in merit pay but are fighting an issue that appeals to the public's inculturated common sense. Paying teachers who perform well more than those who do not is the basis of our free enterprise system (Wynn, 1983). Educational policy decision-makers, that is, legislators, are under pressure to make decisions which appeal to the constituents. A dilemma thus arises in which educators, namely, educational interest groups, are forced into either becoming an active external actor in influencing educational policy-making or accepting undesirable compensation plans. In this manner, merit pay plans provided a challenge to educational interest groups in Pennsylvania today.

The Role of Statewide Educational Interest Groups in Influencing State Legislative Policy

In a seminal work by Easton (1965), political life is analyzed in terms of a political systems approach dealing, in part, with the conversion of societal demands made by a system into political allocations. Works employing the political systems point of view include Cobb and Elder (1972), Wirt and Kirst (1972), Milstein and Jennings (1973), and Campbell and Mazzoni (1976). Historically, scholars have viewed interest groups as playing a basic role in the policy-making part of the political system (Aufderheide, 1976).

Indeed, the major focus of interest group activities has been directed toward the legislative and election processes (Keefe and Ogul, 1964). Because of the paucity of political science research of education created by the apolitical myth, a relatively new area of study in the political system is the efforts of educational [italics added] interest groups in the policy-making arena (Aufderheide, 1976).

Educational interest groups try to gain power and influence over decision-makers in order to satisfy the demands of their constituents. To elicit desired outcomes, interest group lobbyists seek to gain access to decision-makers in the government (Stroufe, 1981). Their success in this endeavor depends, in part, on the resources available to them. These resources or "muscle," so to speak, are derived from various sources such as number of members, amount of money available, status of members, control of information, the symbolic advantage of the importance of children, and the power of the vote (Steele et al., 1981; Milstein & Jennings, 1973; Aufderheide, 1976).

The possession of resources alone, however, does not insure a desired outcome. Addressing the dynamic of influence, allocative theory offers the explanation of policy decisions as resulting from "patterns of accommodation among . . . actors who differ greatly as to resources, intention, and skill" (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976). Success, therefore, depends on both the willingness of an interest group to make resources available to affect policy-making and on their skillful use (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976).

To summarize, the reasons why interest groups may acquire more influence than others are:

1. Some actors have more political resources at their disposal than others; or

2. Given the resources at their disposal, some actors use more of them to gain political influence; or

3. Given the resources at their disposal, some actors use them more skillfully or effectively than others do (Dahl, 1963, p.228).

A variety of means (see Appendix A) have been cited by which interest groups transmit their demands on policy issues to legislators (decision-makers). This process has been given the name lobbying (Keefe and Ogul, 1964).

In a study by Milstein and Jennings (1973) of the New York State legislature, areas of focus targeted specifically by educational interest groups were revealed. Gaining access to the governor's office was viewed as critical. Influencing legislative leaders of committees and majority leaders was attempted as educational interest groups perceived the legislature as centrally controlled by a handful of legislators. Educational interest groups saw providing data and information to legislators regarding educational policy as their most potent mechanism. Pressure at the grass roots on legislators was maintained. Interest group leaders, however, had the primary responsibility of affecting policy-making. These individuals practiced frequent visits and contacts with governor's aides and legislative leaders.

Research findings by Aufderheide (1976) of four major state level educational interest groups listed sources of lobbying strength as: staff contacts; local member contacts with legislative leaders; providing information; using status of members; campaign money; making

use of sizable memberships, interest group professional staff, and coalitions with other groups.

As shown above, educational interest groups use various means of manipulating their resources to influence and gain power over legislators in the policy-making process.

Regarding a change in the use of various lobbying tactics in recent decades, Wilson (1981) claimed that the lobbyists of the eighties use features similar to those of the fifties. To illustrate, lobbyists today still try to maintain close ties with government officials as they did in the fifties; legislators still use the technical guidance of lobbyists. Changes are seen, however, in that group politics today employs tactics involving pressure as opposed to past methods of mere persuasion. Examples cited are the open fund raisers for election campaigns and the formation of political action committees (PACs) to accomplish this end.

Another change is that the extent and vigor of lobbyists has grown to the point where larger unions no longer necessarily have a competitive edge over smaller unions. In addition, competent lobbyists change jobs today taking to their new positions the access acquired previously.

Today, new lobbying strategies are described as more populist or participatory. For example, manufactured letter writing campaigns were considered valueless and vulgar in the fifties. Public demonstrations, popularized by the anti-Vietnam War movement, are now used to display an intensity of feeling to decision-makers. Finally, the use of ordinary interest group members in testimonial hearings has

developed as opposed to limiting lobbying to expert lobbyists.

Cigler and Loomis (1983) agreed that interest groups still engage in classic forms of lobbying such as offering legislative testimony, but that more forms are used than ever before, for example, computer-based direct mail campaigns to elicit grass roots support. These authors also note that, as interest group activity increases, so pressure on decision-makers does as well. Congressional reforms opening the legislative process to the public have fostered further interest in decision-making and more points of access than ever before.

At present, "the educational profession has accepted the fundamental necessity of political involvement" (Kirst & Somers, 1981). Because the government must respond to the collective needs of society in addition to dealing with, as Truman stated, the significant power wielded by pressure groups, the study of how solutions are formulated to complex questions in the policy-making arena becomes significant.

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

Conceptual Framework

"The study of politics is concerned with understanding how authoritative decisions are made and executed for society" (Easton, 1957, p. 197). In order to integrate the findings of this study into a coherent and meaningful pattern of political phenomena, political systems theory by David Easton and allocative theory as presented by Campbell and Mazzoni were employed.

Political systems theory and allocative theory.

Authoritative decisions are formulated through a system of interrelated activities that influence how values, i.e., limited material or symbolic objects, are allocated for society. Easton's political systems model describes a process whereby stress in the social environment generates supports and demands (inputs) upon the political system. The political system in a thruput process in turn reduces or converts these inputs into public decisions or outputs. The outputs are then fed back into society as redefined or reaffirmed social values generating another set of inputs to the political system (Easton, 1965).

This conceptual framework clearly defines stages for analysis which facilitate an orderly review of political events in the policy-making process. Because the stage wherein educational interest groups interact with the formal legislative bodies was the focus of this study, the conversion (thruput) stage of Easton's model were isolated for analysis. System actors, in this work a relatively stable set of interest groups who have a continuing concern with public school policy, and their influencing mechanisms are encompassed in this conversion or thruput process stage (Milstein & Jennings, 1973).

Easton's system framework helped to place the function of actor groups and their activities in the policy-making process in perspective as a phase of a cycle. However, when investigating influence as the dynamic in the pattern of actor relationships through which functions are performed, conflicts are resolved, and decisions reached, the research framework should further address the competitive

constructs of resource, power, and influence found in allocative theory. Based on this theory, the explanation for policy decisions is revealed by defining patterns of accommodation among competing actors who differ in terms of their resources, intention, and skill. The fundamental concepts associated with actor relationships are power, influence, and resource (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976). Dahl (1984) attributed differences in the amount of influence exercised to three fundamental factors:

1. Differences in the distribution of political resources.
2. Variations in the extent to which individuals use their resources for political purposes.
3. Variations in the skill or efficiency with which individuals use their political resources. (p. 31)

Areas of focus of allocative theory, therefore, are resources and their utilization to exert influence.

To summarize, political systems theory offers a framework for orientation to the policy-making process. Through an understanding of this system, stages for analysis are defined. For the purposes of this study, the conversion or thruput stage and the activities of the stable or consistent external actors directly involved in the formal legislative arena were chosen for analysis. Allocative theory reveals the dynamic interplay of influence of competing actors. "The explanation for policy decisions, based on this perspective, comes from revealing patterns of accommodation among competing actors who differ greatly as to resources, intention, and skill" (Campbell and Mazzoni, 1976, p. 13).

Methodology

Dahl (1984) states that political life is characterized by its uncertainty. Systematic political analysis can aide in reducing some of the uncertainty inherent in this phenomena. While attempting to provide a more scientific view of the political phenomena of policy-making, Van Dalen (1962) presented a need for descriptive policy research.

> Unless educators accumulate relevant facts about a situation, they cannot sense what is significant. If they do not possess the facts, they cannot fit them into complex frames of relationships that reveal general scientific theories and laws and thus produce a more sophisticated level of knowledge. (p. 213)

Although interest groups have been recognized as playing a basic role in public policy-making, the activities of educational interest groups in this process is a relatively new area of study (Aufderheide, 1973). Because of the early stage of development of this area of study, an exploratory case study method was chosen to attempt, as Van Dalen above suggests, to describe qualitatively what is as opposed to predicting relationships through hypothesis-testing appropriate to a more advanced area of study (Hall and Loucks, 1982; Festinger & Katz, 1953).

The sources of information used for this study consisted of in-depth formal interviews and documents, publications, and records. The formal interviews provided the bulk of the data for the case study. The group of interviewees consisted of officials from the Governor's office, the Department of Education, the Pennsylvania Federation of Teachers, the Pennsylvania State Education Association, the Pennsylvania School Board Association, and the Pennsylvania State Legisla-

ture. An interview guide of questions (see Appendix B) designed according to Deutsch's (1973) outline of variables affecting the course of conflict (see Appendix C) directed the interview process. Interest group and government publications, documents and records further provided data and served as a means to verify and corroborate data collected during the interviews. The outline of variables affecting the course of conflict by Deutsch (1973) was used to organize and analyze descriptive data regarding the merit pay case study.

Summary of the Findings

The merit pay conflict evolved from the climate of school reform. The teachers' unions PSEA and PaFT worked actively against the issue. The major reasons why they opposed merit pay for teachers were that such plans were found to be divisive and demoralizing in nature; not able to motivate consistent, high performance; subject to favoritism and subjectivity; and unable to attract better people to the field.

The executive and administrative offices, namely, the governor's office and the Department of Education worked in favor of the issue. PSBA also supported the issue. The proponents' reasons for merit pay included the appeal of logic and common sense, the purported increase in the prestige of teachers, the recognition and reward of excellent teachers, and the offer of financial incentives to improve teacher performance and student achievement.

The most frequently used influencing mechanisms during the merit pay conflict by those involved were use of a salaried lobbyist and

direct contact with legislators. These were also viewed as the most effective influencing mechanisms by the governor's office, PDE, teacher unions, PSBA, and legislative interviewees.

Opponent strategies to the merit pay issue included lobbying the governor, the PDE, legislators in key positions and the conferees to maneuver the transfer of the merit pay money to professional development using the reputation and credibility of the level of the teaching profession as support for the legitimacy of being able to say that merit pay for teachers does not work. Testimony at legislative hearings, campaign work, networking, media use, and grassroots work were also done using such union resources as number of members, communications and research departments, and paper resources.

Proponent strategies included lobbying legislators in high positions, offering testimony at legislative hearings, using sympathetic legislators as spokesman, building consensus throughout the educational community using participative management techniques, offering assistance and funding to the school districts, and using resources such as prestige and staff.

The sources of influence and legislative points to access regarding the merit pay conflict were the Majority and Minority Chairmen of the Education and Appropriations Committees in the House and Senate, the Republican leadership in the House and Senate, the Democratic leadership in the House, and the Conference Committee. Basically, the educational policy decision of merit pay for teachers was made using various norms of educational policy-making. First, the title of the Excellence in Teaching Awards was a euphemism used to

inhibit voting against the issue, i.e., legislators would not easily vote against excellence in education. Second, an attempt was made in the legislature to offer an amendment to the budget proposal to include the Excellence in Teaching Awards. Third, an attempt was made to attach an amendment opposed by the teachers' union, namely, the Excellence in Teaching Awards, to a bill strongly supported by the teachers' unions. Fourth, the final decision regarding the issue was made by the conference committee that recommends the final budget document to the legislative chambers where the document is always approved at that point.

Conclusions

1. The merit pay concept clearly evolved from the climate of school reform.

In response to this climate and the subsequently identified need for improvement in the performance of teachers, part of Governor Thornburgh's solution was the initiation of merit pay. Although the thinking common to the educational community at the time was in accord with the idea of improvement in teacher performance and recognition for quality performance, the data show that even the people who were part of the policy development were not personally supportive of the merit pay concept. Thus, even though the outward professional support was present, little true personal commitment to merit pay for teachers evolved.

2. The key person who engineered the consensus building which led to the statewide acceptance of the agenda for excellence was the Secretary of Education Wilburn.

Given this responsibility by the Governor, Wilburn's unique skills and characteristics seemed to have facilitated the agenda building process. To explain, his knowledge of the science of administration caused him to travel throughout the state holding approximately 200 meetings to provide the educational community an opportunity to express needs and to participate in the agenda building process. He also used these meetings to guide and shape the thinking of the educational community to specific areas of concern and to gain consensus during the meetings that something needed to be done in those specific areas. As an entree to such a consensus, Wilburn began with a general area, that is, curriculum course requirements, that had been on the table during 1982. Thus, he began with an area already accepted for discussion and a concern in people's minds. This began the inertia of agreement which Wilburn used and maintained successfully to gain agreement on the other two areas.

He also held weekly meetings with a group of 12 to 15 individuals representing PSEA, PaFT, PDE, PSBA, the principals' associations PAESP and PASSP, the superintendents' association PASA, intermediate units and some parent groups to provide an opportunity for input and to discuss the specifics of what should be done with the curriculum. Thus, agreement on the curriculum reform was worked out with input from every major organization.

The room in which this group met was carefully chosen by Wilburn. A very small room was selected because, as Wilburn stated, "the closer you get people together, the less room there is for bizarre behavior." He felt that less anger and fewer negative

statements would result in a small room.

In addition, because Wilburn had been Director of the Budget in Pennsylvania previously, he knew the workings of the government and knew the legislators personally. This background provided him the insight, and correctly so, that if the educational community presented the legislature with a program for school reform, that funding would be granted. Also, because of his previous closeness to the Pennsylvania government, Governor Thornburgh was familiar with him and his ability, and thus gave him a free hand to devise and implement his plans.

In conclusion, the speed at which the agenda was developed (from January to October), the almost unanimous agreement and support of the agenda that was engendered in the educational community, and the idea for the three areas in the agenda were a result of the administrative skills and knowledge of this Secretary of Education.

3. The myth that education is removed from politics is over. As shown in this case study, significant involvement and activity by actors outside of the formal decision making process take place during the policy making regarding educational issues. Because this involvement has become so much a part of the decision making process, politicians can no longer suggest that they will not allow politics to interfere with education. A corollary to the above conclusion is that educational policy-making is formed through the lobbying efforts of educational interest groups.

4. The use of a hired lobbyist and direct contact with legislators are highly effective influencing mechanisms.

A reason for PSEA's widely known effectiveness in influencing the legislature is that the chief lobbyist spends his time using influencing mechanisms viewed as most effective by legislators. Not only did this lobbyist spend his time using what are possibly the most effective lobbying techniques, he also viewed merit pay in the same manner as motivation theorists, i.e., he sought to raise salaries generally and would only then consider some type of reward for the best teachers (Herzberg, 1959). This lobbyist discussed what was stated consistently in the literature at the time, i.e., that teachers' salaries were too low to attract the more capable students into the field of education. He also exhibited a knowledge that merit pay plans for teachers had no research base supporting them and that such plans had not worked in the past.

The above information regarding the PSEA lobbyist is pointed out to identify the high level of performance at which he was functioning and the conclusion that some of PSEA's power is derived from the expertise of the lobbying staff involved. That is, while lobbying, he used the most effective lobbying techniques, he was familiar with the literature regarding the effectiveness of merit pay plans, and his direction was correct according to motivation theory. The chief lobbyist for PSEA maintains almost daily contact with legislators. Perhaps this high level of functioning adds significantly to PSEA's influence in the legislature.

5. Knowledge based positions regarding merit pay for teachers are against the issue.

An observation made was that, with the exception of one, the in-

dividuals who gave research (literature) based responses in their discussions of merit pay were the individuals who were personally against the issue. A conclusion might, therefore, be that if one would study the knowledge base surrounding the issue, the decision would be not to support merit pay. This difference was also found among the legislators. One legislator's responses indicated a familiarity with the knowledge base regarding merit pay. He was opposed to merit pay. Another used the appeal of logic only in his argument and supported the issue.

6. Overall, the knowledge of the people in Harrisburg involved in the conflict was research based.

They were informed regarding merit pay plans for teachers and used this information to defeat the passage of the merit pay for teachers proposal.

7. There is confusion in some proponent arguments for merit pay between recognition of good teaching and financial incentive. As seen in this study's review of the literature, recognition can be accomplished through means other than money. In arguments in favor of merit pay, some officials mentioned a need to recognize and to reward quality performance. According to motivation theorists (Lortie, 1975; Sergiovanni, 1967; Herzberg, 1959; Meyer, 1975), recognizing teachers is good; using money to do that is not.

8. A coalition of PSEA and PaFT would provide the unions more strength than they have individually.

Although PSEA and PaFT are aware of what the other union is doing, they do not work together. This researcher asserts that, by

working together, PSEA could benefit from PaFT's ability to work with the executive branch and PaFT could benefit from PSEA's strength.

9. The manner in which the proponents of merit pay tried to pass the proposal through the legislature was by: (a) an amendment to the 1984-85 budget by a legislator who also sat on the appropriations committee, thus having some influence there. This legislator knew that the amendment would pass because of the proposal's title Excellence in Education Awards, i.e., that no one would vote against excellence in education, (b) an amendment to the 1986 House Bill 408, the minimum salary for teachers bill. The minimum salary bill by itself was strongly supported by the teachers' unions. A legislator known to other legislators and lobbyists as artful in this type of maneuver offered an amendment to add the Excellence in Teaching Awards proposal to the minimum salary bill, and (c) proposals made directly a part of the budget presentation to the legislature for two years, that is, for the 1985-86 and 1986-87 budgets.

10. The only way that the issue of merit pay is ever going to be resolved as to whether it does make sense or not is to remove the ideology and make the question empirical in nature.

In other words, the concept of merit pay for teachers should be tested scientifically by a number of researchers so that the decision is not left to the strength of politics.

Recommendations for Further Study

1. As one legislator mentioned during this study, there are two kinds of influencing taking place in the legislature. One is lobbyists influencing legislators; the other is legislators influencing

the legislature leadership. A most interesting study in the mind of this researcher would be to study the latter.

2. Because agenda and consensus building were such critical elements in the successful acceptance of the agenda for excellence in Pennsylvania, the areas of agenda building and consensus building are recommended for further study.

3. Due to the difference in number and amount of resources owned by each educational interest group, a comparison of the resources and power of educational interest groups to the outcomes of major state issues from 1960 (when educational interest groups increased in involvement in state policy-making) to the present, is recommended for further study. This study would hopefully shed more light on who has the most influence on policy making and why, i.e., who or what is really shaping educational policy.

4. Another suggested area of study is how legislators make decisions and why lobbying is so effective. In other words, a study of the impact of lobbying at the state level regarding the actual influence of educational interest groups on the legislators' points of view is suggested. The present study looked at influencing tactics employed. Another study could look at the impact of the tactics on legislators. By identifying which influencing mechanisms are viewed as most effective by legislators, educators would better know which to use to influence policy-making in favor of education.

5. A replication of this study using another issue to discover whether the influencing mechanisms and legislative points of access were similar is recommended.

6. Another area of question is whether educational policy-making is different in nature from other areas of policy-making.

7. As little has been done empirically in terms of studying merit pay plans for teachers, such studies are greatly in need. Motivation theory and related studies are a recommended conceptual framework from which to work.

8. As stated by Pipho (1988), "legislatures have increasingly become the central arenas for state policy making. In the case of education, the legislatures are actually taking some of the leadership capability away from the executive branch and from state boards of education." This topic in relation to the Pennsylvania legislature is suggested for study.

Recommendations for Policy-Making

Based upon the research contained within this study, the following recommendations are made regarding the development of a plan to motivate teachers to consistent high performance and to attract more and better people to the field.

1. Steps should be taken to ensure cooperation during planning so that everyone involved has an opportunity for input to the plan. At the state level, this would include PSEA, PaFT, PSBA, PASSP, PAESP, PASA, and PDE, the governor's Office of Policy Development, and state legislators. The planning process should not proceed without involvement from each group.

2. Consensus building throughout the educational community is suggested to engender understanding, agreement, and support.

Note: Cooperation and consensus building throughout the educational

community are processes that generalize to all policy making issues.

3. Motivation theory and the literature on merit pay and career ladders, particularly the former, should be carefully studied by the participants in the planning process before the process begins.

4. Plans should strive to enhance intrinsic motivation. To reiterate what motivation theorists have said, intrinsic motivators or rewards motivate and maintain high quality performance and account for job satisfaction. Other than positive feedback which increases motivation, external rewards weaken intrinsic motivators or rewards making their addition counterproductive.

5. Steps should be taken to ensure that job dissatisfiers such as poor working conditions and low salary are erased before expecting to see an effort towards high performance. According to motivation theorists, if job dissatisfaction exists, motivators will have little effect.

6. As persons with high self-esteem perform better than those with low self-esteem, measures should be included to develop positive self-esteem in staff members.

If a compensation plan other than lock step is pursued in the future, in this researcher's opinion, levels of attainment available to all teachers should become a part of the educational structure so that teachers are able to achieve higher professional stature without leaving the teaching position. The most critical component of this system would be a freedom on the part of the teacher to choose whether or not to pursue the next higher level of attainment.

Movement to each higher level should not be based upon the

decision of any person or persons, but should be a result of the fulfillment of the requirements or attainment of the criteria used to delineate each level. Rewards that enhance intrinsic motivation should be available at each level, keeping in mind that job satisfiers are those related to work content including achievement, recognition for such achievement, intrinsic interest in the work, growth and advancement. Finally, salaries in general should be raised to enhance the prestige of the teaching profession.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

LOBBYING TECHNIQUES

by Keefe and Ogul (1969)

1. Hiring a lobbyist - a person who is personally engaging with good negotiating skills who knows and has the confidence of legislators. Hiring ex-legislators is a popular technique due to the 'built-in' access acquired.
2. Making financial contributions to campaigns and doing campaign work.
3. Inspiring letter writing campaigns.
4. Using the media.
5. Social lobbying (providing entertainment for legislators) and bribery (now viewed as uncommon and ineffective).
6. Using sanctions.
7. Demonstrative lobbying.
8. Lobbying alliances or coalitions.
9. Grassroots public relations campaigning.
10. Presenting testimony at legislative hearings.
11. Presenting research data to legislators.
12. Contacting legislators directly.
13. Using intermediaries, i.e., personal friends of the legislators or constituents - to speak to legislators.
14. Publishing voting records (Keefe & Ogul, 1964, pp.358-377).

APPENDIX B

CASE STUDY OF EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING

INTERVIEW GUIDE

The following questionnaire deals with educational policy-making at the state level and, specifically, the efforts made regarding the Excellence in Teaching Awards issue during the years 1983 through 1986.

I. The nature of the issue giving rise to the conflict.

A. What was the nature of the issue giving rise to the conflict? What specific actions were taken on the issue and when?

B. Who initiated the demand for a policy change or was most responsible for making it an issue?

C. What was the position taken by the individual?

D. Whom did this individual speak for or represent?

E. How important was this issue to your group? Was it of major or minor importance? Why?

II. The characteristics of the parties in question.

A. Were you active in the Excellence in Teaching Awards issue in Pennsylvania at any time during the years 1983-1986? If so, what role did you play? Describe your involvement.

B. What was your group's position on the issue?

C. Did you work together with any other groups on the issue?

D. Who were the key actors from those groups?

E. What was your groups' objective? What were you trying to gain?

F. What resources were available to you for use during this effort: 1983-1986? How were these resources used?

III. The strategies and tactics employed by the parties in the conflict.

A. What were the influencing mechanisms and lobbying techniques employed? How were these employed?

B. Which were the most effective?

C. What strategies did you employ?

D. Issue position: For _____ Against _____

The following is a list of influencing mechanisms which may have been used to influence educational policy-making regarding the Excellence in Teaching Awards in Pennsylvania from 1983-1986.

DIRECTIONS

Column A - Please rate the use of each influencing mechanism by your organization according to the following scale:

1. Most frequently used
2. Frequently used
3. Sometimes used
4. Seldom used
5. Never used

Column B - Please rate your perception of the effectiveness of each influencing mechanism according to the following scale:

X - Most effective
Y - Moderately effective
Z - Ineffective

Influencing Mechanisms	Column A Frequency of use 1 2 3 4 5	Column B Effectiveness X Y Z
A. Use of a salaried lobbyist.	_ _ _ _ _	_ _ _
B. Financial contributions to campaigns and campaign work.	_ _ _ _ _	_ _ _
C. Letter writing campaigns.	_ _ _ _ _	_ _ _
D. Use of the media.	_ _ _ _ _	_ _ _
E. Social Lobbying (providing entertainment for legislators).	_ _ _ _ _	_ _ _
F. Use of sanctions.	_ _ _ _ _	_ _ _
G. Demonstrations.	_ _ _ _ _	_ _ _
H. Lobbying alliances or coalitions.	_ _ _ _	_ _ _
I. Grassroots public relations campaigns.	_ _ _ _ _	_ _ _
J. Testimony at legislative hearings.	_ _ _ _	_ _ _
K. Presenting research data to legislators.	_ _ _ _ _	_ _ _
L. Direct contact with legislators.	_ _ _ _ _	_ _ _
M. Use of intermediaries, i.e., personal friends or constituents to speak to legislators.	_ _ _ _ _	_ _ _
N. Publication of voting records.	_ _ _ _ _	_ _ _

IV. The consequences of the conflict.

A. What was the outcome of the conflict?

B. What are the reasons for your response?

C. What were the actual gains and/or losses to your group? To the other groups?

V. How the decision was made.

A. What were your sources of influence or points of access? Which legislators were involved in the effort and how?

B. What are the norms for resolving issues in the educational policy-making arena at the state level?

C. So, to summarize, how would you say influence was achieved? Basically, how was the final decision made?

D. What are some general comments that you can make about educational policy-making at the state level in Pennsylvania?

E. Do you have any other comments about the Excellence in Teaching Awards issue that have not been covered in this interview?

F. Do you have any written information, including records, notes, testimonials, published articles, etc. regarding this issue (1983-1986) or the use of influencing mechanisms?

Thank you!

APPENDIX C

AN OUTLINE OF VARIABLES AFFECTING

THE COURSE OF CONFLICT

by Morton Deutsch (1973)

I. The nature of the issue giving rise to the conflict.

A. Environment.
B. Motivational significance.

II. The characteristics of the parties in question.

A. Roles.
B. Positions for or against merit pay for teachers.

III. The influencing mechanisms and strategies employed by the parties in the conflict.

A. Influencing mechanisms or lobbying techniques used.
B. Strategies for and against.

IV. The consequences of the conflict.

A. Outcomes.
B. Reasons.

V. How the decision was made.

A. Sources of influence and legislative points of access.
B. The nature of the norms of educational policy-making exhibited during the merit pay conflict.

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